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1. SUWu\RY: Petr is R female high schoo1. student ~ · 
who sought admission to Philadelphia's all male high school;~ 
~;-~at 
she was denied admission solely on the basis of her s
Petr claims this violated the Equal Protection Clause and the 
Equal Education Opportunities Act of 1974. 
....,.~-· 4 . 
2. FACTS: The facts as found by the district court 
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Philadelphia maintains two types of senior high schools 
for college bound students: comprehensive and academic. 
The only two schools in the academic category, Philadelphia 
High School for Girls (female only) and Central High School 
(male only), have been segregated by sex since their found-
ing in the nineteenth century. Girls and Central are the 
only two schools which draw their student bodies from the 
entire city. Admission is granted upon application of a 
student who meets certain academic requirements (tests and 
grades); only 7% of the students in the Philadelphia school 
district meet the admission standards. The admissions 
standards for both schools are comparable. The courses of-
fered at Girls are similar and of equal quality to those 
offered at Centralo Since its founding in 1848 as a school 
to train teachers, Girls has become "the equal of Central in 
preparing its students for college." With one exception, the 
academic facilities of the two schools are comparable. "In 
general, it can be concluded that the education available to 
the female students at Girls is comparable to that available 
to the males at Central." Graduates of both schools have been 
and are accepted by the best and the most prestigious colleges. 
The schools differ in the following respects: (1) Central 
has better scientific facilities; (2) Central has earned and 
maintained a unique reputation for academic excellence and for 
training men who will become local and national leaders in all 






graduates who have achieved similar prominence; (3) because 
of its academic standing and reputation, Central has at-
tracted the attention (and speeches) of national leaders 
throughout the school's history; (4) Central has a dedicated, 
loyal, and distinguished alumni who are involved in matters 
pertaining to the school and who have established a substantial 
private endowment for the school. There is no evidence that as 
a result of this endowment Central's facilities, faculty, or 
course of instruction is superior to Girls. 
Both Central and Girls offer their students a more 
intensive intellectual experience and better preparation for 
college than is offered by any of the nonacademic high schools. 
Admission to a comprehensive high school is normally based on 
a student's residence. Three of the comprehensive high schools 
are sexually segregated (2 male, 1 female). 
In 1974, while in the ninth grade, petr applied for 
admission to Central; she met the academic qualifications but 
was rejected solely on the basis of her sex. Her parents 
brought this § 1983 action on her behalf and on behalf of the 
class of similarly situated females. She chose not to apply for 
admission to Girls and enrolled in a comprehensive coeducational 
high school in her neighborhood. Her motivation and grades have 
declined, in part because of her perception that her teachers 
expect and demand less than was expected at her academic, coed, 
junior high school. After trial, the DC ordered that petr and 
her class not be denied admission on the basis of sex; CA 3 did 
( 
- 4 -
not stay this order as to petr. Nevertheless, petr declined 
to attend Central. Since the trial petr has qualified for 
early admission to college after the eleventh grade and, ac-
cording to resps, citing a Philadelphia newspaper, petr will 
enter college this fall. 
7 
At trial, the studies of two expert witnesses were 
considered by the DC. The Tidball study concluded generally 
that women from coed colleges were not as career successful as 
women from all female colleges. The Jones study examined at-
titudes of New Zealand secondary students toward their school, 
schoolwork, extracurricular activities, and the approval of 
their parents and peerso The study concluded generally that 
boys and girls at single sex schools in New Zealand held 
attitudes associated with stronger academic motivation than 
boys and girls at coed schools. Tidball is a woman, Jones is a 
man. 
Resps' goals relevant to academic high schools are 
(1) increasing efficiency and basic skills of students, 
(2) providing an extensive network of early childhood program-
ming, and (3) providing educational options to students and 
parents. 
3. DECISIONS BELOW: The DC (Newcomer, E.D. Pa.) 
concluded that the substantial equality of the education at 
the two schools and the lack of evidence that exclusion of women 
from Central had generated a sense of inferiority in the women 
students took the case out of the realm of Brown. Nevertheless, 
( 
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the court found that female students were unconstitutionally 
denied the opportunity to attend a coeducational, academically 
1/ 
superior, public high school. - "Having identified this 
classification [men and women] as adversely affecting women," 
the court found that it was not justified by a fair and sub-
stantial relationship to the resps legitimate goals. The 
court acknowledged that under a mere rational relationship 
test the classification would be constitutional. 
On appeal, CA 3 ~ sponte raised the issue of the 
application of the Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 
1974, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1701-21 (relevant sections attached to this 
memo). It then examined the legislative histories of a 1972 
act pertaining to federally funded educational programs, 
20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-86, a prior formulation of the EEOA that was 
2/ 
not enacted, and the EEOA. - Based on this analysis, the 
1/ 
The DC also seemed to find some harm in the frustration of 
petr's desire to attend Central, "a desire which, in light of 
Central's history and reputation, does not seem frivolous or 
eccentric." Opinion, Petn., at 82a-83a. 
2/ 
CA 3's analysis is somewhat confusing and hardly a model of 
statutory interpretation. It first noted that the 1972 legis-
lation, prohibiting sexual discrimination in federally funded 
schools, did not apply to the admission policies of secondary 
schools, despite the House version of the bill, which covered all 
primary and secondary schools. It then observed that the 1972 
version of the EEOA originally contained no reference to sexual 
discrimination, that references were added in committee, that 
some of these references were omitted without explanation, that 
the bill was defeated, and that the EEOA 'tvas passed in 1974. 
Applying this history to the ambiguities of the statute, CA 3 
concludes that "Congress spoke clearly enough on single-sex schools 
in 1972 when it chose to defer action in order to secure the data 
needed for an intelligent judgment." Opinion, Petn., at lla. 
The dissenter's complaint that CA 3 has found silence in 1972 to 




court concluded that the Act does not require that every 
school be coeducational. 
On the constitutional claim, CA 3 distinguished this 
Court's sex discrimination cases on the ground that every 
case striking down a sex classification involved an in-
adequacy of female rights in relation to male rights. The 
court found that petr was not deprived of an opportunity for 
equal education, since any benefits or detriments inherent in 
the single sex academic high schools falls on both sexes 
equally. Whether or not the theory underlying separation of 
the sexes into equal schools is conclusive, it is based on 
equal,-h!:,ne,!it, ~ discriminatory denial. CA 3 concluded that 
under either standard of review, the single sex school policy 
3/ 
was constitutional. -
Judge Gibbons dissented on both the statutory and 
constitutional claims. Disagreeing with the majority's reading 
of the legislative history and the provisions of the EEOA, he 
argued that Congress had, pursuant to § 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment as construed in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 
(1966), found that single sex schools violate the equal pro-
tection clause and had therefore prohibited them. On the 
In support of its conclusion, CA 3 cited Williams v. McNair, 
316 F. Supp. 134 (D. S.C. 1970), aff'd, 401 U.S. 951 (1971). 
There the DC refused to find an equal protection violation when 
two institutions in an eight school system were single sex (one 
male, one female). Plaintiffs were males seeking entry into the 
female school. This Court affirmed without opinion. 
- 7 -
constitutional issue, the dissenter argued that the 
l 
majority had impermissibly resurrected the "separate but 
equal" doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537. He 
felt that Brown prohibited that result. Judge Gibbons 
concluded that the exclusion of females from Central did 
not bear a fair and substantial relationship to the resps' 
legitimate goals. 
4. CONTENTIONS: Petr contends that the two schools 
are not equal because Central's superior science facilities 
and the "intangibles" noted supra. She also claims that 
Central's refusal to admit girls "carr[ies] a clear message 
[ h ] f 1 [ ] b f h ' d '" . h t at ema es are mem ers o t e secon sex, .!: o~·, t e 
Brown inferiority complex. She then contends that resps have 
not shown a fair and substantial relationship between the un-
equal treatment and the resps' goals. On the statutory issue, 
petr contends that the EEOA prohibits separation of the sexes 
in the only two academic high schools and that it declares such 
separation to violate the Equal Protection Clause. 
Resps agree with CA 3 on the constitutional and statutory 
issues and further contend that the case is moot because petr 
is going to college in the fall and the DC did not properly 
certify the case as a class action. They claim that the improper 
certification results from the DC's failure "as soon as practi-
cable after the commencement of an action o •• [to] determine by 
order" that the case is properly brought as a class action. 
(Rule 23(c)(l)). They also cite the DC's failure to make express 
-tt~ ~ 
\ ' ,A.,~.~~ 




findings that the Rule 23(a) prerequisites were satisfied. 
5. DISCUSSION: The DC's conclusions of law, dated 
the same day as the judgment and order, include the following: 
"This suit is a. proper class action 
under Federal Rule 23(b){2). Plaintiff 
is therefore c~tj fied pursuant to that 
subsection as the representative of all 
those females, who otherwise meet the 
admission standards of Central High 
School, who have been, are, or will be 
denied admission to Central because of 
their sex." 
Resps cite no authority to support their contention that this 
does not satisfy the Rule 23 requirements. Even if this is 
adequate certification, however, a mootness problem remains. 
In Indianapolis School Comm'rs v. Jacobs, 420 U.S. 128 (1975), 
this Court held that when a named plaintiff drops out of an 
action the case is moot unless it was duly certified as a class 
J~J ~_7 action, a controversy still exists between members of the class 
. u s L ~1. '-('JlG I 
· · r/ '• ..... J-r and the opposition, and the issue is such that it is capable of V3r.; ~ - -:~ v - ..__ ______ --
~~:"'~ repetition yet evading review. Id., at 129 (emphasis added). 
~ ~~ Assuming that Susan Vorchheimer, the named plaintiff, has dropped 
""'().. ..ll 
out (because she decline~ to attend Central when permitted by 




is moot under the third Jacobs requirement. Students may apply 
to academic high schools as early as January in the ninth grade; 
thus, a plaintiff would have three years to pursue her action. 
This t-7ould not seem to evade review. 
On the merits, the case raises some interesting but not 





question of whether the two schools are equal. As to 
educational opportunity, the £C's findings clearly establish 
~guality. Neither the DC, CA 3, nor the appellate dissenter 
bought petr's argument that the other differences between 
the two schools are of constitutional significance. Those 
courts seem correct. Petr does not suggest that this Court 
should adopt the DC's version of the inequality: that females 
are denied an opportunity to attend a coeducational academic 
high school. Petr's silence on this point is understandable, 
since both male and female students are denied that opportunity. 
Petr has not claimed anything other than a gender based dis-
crimination • 
The Court may wish to take cert to decide the Brown 'No 
issue of is-sexually-separate-inherently-unequal in the conte~t / 
of high school education. The DC, however, found that there 
was no evidence before it to support that claim. Petrs have 
provided this Court with no support for the assertion that 
women at all-female institutions perceive themselves as inferior. 
J The only sociological studies considered at trial support the 
opposite conclusion. 
Absent any inequality, the question of whi.ch is the 
appropriate standard need not be decided. Resp has classified 
its students by gender, but there is no significant difference 
of treatment between the two classes. 
The statutory issue may be certworthy simply to clarify 
a very ambiguous piece of legislation. Congress' finding on 
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equal protection pertains to . the "maintenance of dual 
school systems in which students are assigned to schools 
so ley on the bas is of • • • sex • • • " 20 U.s .c. § 1702 
(emphasis added). Resps' system is not so maintained, some 
of its schools are. Under Part 2 of the Act, entitled "Un-
lawful Practices," Congress prohibits deliberate segregation 
of students among or within schools by race, color, etc., but 
not by sex. § 1703(a). Yet subsection (c) of the same sec-
tion prohibits assignment of a student to a school other than 
the closest appropriate (grade level and type) one, if the 
assignment results in a greater degree of sex seg-regation. 
Unless "assignment" is construed not to include the voluntary 
application procedure of Girls and Central, resps are in 
violation of this section, at least as to those girls who live 
closer to Central than Girls. Moreover, those female students 
living closer to Girls are possibly being "assigned" to the 
closest appropriate for the purpose of segregating students on 
the basis of sex in violation of § 1705. All these violations 
despite resps' apparent compliance with the congressional policy 
of § 1701 of providing equal educational opportunity without 
regard to sex. Perhaps the statute should be remanded to 
Congress. 
There is a response. 
9/2/76 Kujovich 
ME 





§ 1701. Congr~~lorutl rleclurntlon of policy 
(a) The Congress declares lt to be the policy or the United States that-
( 1) llll children enrolled In public schonls are entitled to equal 
educational opportunity without regard to race, color, sex, or nation-
al origin; and 
( 2) the neighborhood is the appropriate basis for determining 
public school assignments. 
(b) In order to carr:;- out thi!< policy, It Is the purpose of this subchap-
ter to !!pecify appropriate remedies for the orderly removal or the vestiges 
or the dual school system. 
§ 1702. Cong-t·essional findings; necessity fo1· Congr·css to specif)· np-
propri:lte reme~li<•s for elimination or dual school sysh·ms without affect-
Ing judicial enforcement of fifth ntHl fourteenth nrnendments 
I a) The Congress find s that-
( 1) the maintenance of dual school systems in which students 
are assigned to schools solely on th e basis of race, color, sex, or na-
tional origin denies to those students the equal protection of the 
laws guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment; 
§ 1703. Deninl of equal educational opporttmi ty prohibited 
Xo State shall d eny equal educational opportunity to an individual on 
account of his or her r ace, color, sex , or national origin, by-
( a) the deliberate segregation by an educational agency of s t udents 
on the basis of race, color, or national O!·igio a.mong or within 
schools; 
(c) t!1e assignment by an educational agency of a student to a 
school, other than the one closest to his or her place of re:sidence 
within the school district in which he or she resides, if the assign-
ment results in a greater degree of segregation of stu(~ents on the 
basis of ru~e . color, sex. or n?tional origin among th e schools of 
such agency than woulcl result if such (;tudeut we re assigr.ed to th~ 
achool closest to his or her place of residence within the school dis-
trict of such agency pro\·iding th e appropriate grade level and type 
or education for such student; 
.• (e) the transfer by an educat.ion,tl agency, · \vhether voluntary or 
otherwise, or a student from on e school tc another if the purpose and 
effect of such transfer is to increase segregation of stud('nts on the 
basis of race, color, or national origin among the schools of such 
agency; or 
t:j 1'70:). .<\sl!lg-runt'nt on nt'lghhor·lu)()() h11sls not n denlul of E'<}Uul edu· 
CHlional opportunity 
Subject to the other provisions of this subchapter, the a!ls!gnment by 
an educational agency of a student to the school nearest his vlace of resi-
dence which vro\·ictes the approvriate grade le1·e1 and type of education 
for such student Is not a denial of equal educational opportunity or or 
equal protection or the laws unless such assignment is for the purpose 
or segregating students on the basis of race, color, sex, or national origin, 
or the school to which such student Is assigned was located on lts site for 
the purpose of segregating students on such basis. 
§ 1706. Civil actions by indh·idunlll denied t>qunJ educational oppor-
tunities or by Attorney General 
An Individual denied an equal educational opportunity, as defined by 
this subchapter may institute a cl\·il action in an appropriate district 
court of the United Stn.tes against such parties, and for such relief, as 
may be appropriate. · 
§ 1720. Definitions 
For the purposes of this subchapter-
(c) The term "segregation·· means the operation of a school system 
In which students are wholly or substantially separated among the schools 
of an educational agency on the basis or race, color, sex, or natiqnal origin 
or within a school on the basis of race, color, or national origin. 
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February 21, 1977 
BENCH MEMO 
To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Dave Martin 
No. 76-37, Vorchheimer v. School Dist. of Philadelphia 
This is a difficult and close case, but I believe the 
petitioner has the better of it. I think th~ollowing rationale 
is the best of many axaiiaaxxaaa available for deciding the 
case: Central and Girls are sufficiently siffi£Hik different, 
to the disadvantage of 
wixkxxka/females,aaiwgxsixasxawxagas; to call for justification 
under the standard of Craig v. Boren. The state's interest 
in fostering maximum educational attainment and a suitably 
serious attitude toward eduational pursuits is undeniably 
i~m important, but the evidence does not show a substantial 
relationahip w between these goals and sex-segregated academic 
high schools. This would be a constitutional holding and 
would not rest on the Equal Educational Opportunit~es Act of 
1974b(e€o~). 
And now for the details . . . . 
Mootness. The suit is moot as to the named petitioner. 
But the DC certified a class action and specified the class 
that petr represents, Pet. App. at 55a (Conclusion 3). Resp 
argues that this is inadequate, since the DC did not make 
sryecific findings or conelusions with respect to all the factors 
listed in Rule 23(a). Resp is right about the lack of specifics 
as to those factors, but I disagree with resp's conclusion. 
~~a Board of School,Cornrnissioners v. Jacobs, 420 u.s. 128, 
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found inadequate certification for failure to describe the 
members of the class. It went no further. That requirement 
is met here, and I do not think it makes sense to expand Jacobs. 
xaxam»xa«a It would have been better for the court to specify 
its findings under Rule 23(a)--and thabpinwn here could so 
for mootness /' 
state--but dismissal/is a harsh sanction to visit upon petr's 
class for the failings of the judge, especially when there seem1 
to be no dispute that the 23(a) requimmenffi are in fact satisfied. 
The federal statutes. Resp's policy of sex segregation 
for the two academic high schools does not violate Title IX,see 
20 U.S.C. § 168l(a)(1). Whether it v~olates the EEOA, 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1701, et seq., is a mH«k tougher questi~n, since the Act 
is not well drafted and since it carries contradictory indicatioas 
as to congressional intent regarding sex six«ximiRaxiaR segre-
gation. But there is a tougher question yet. If Philadelphia's 
policy violat~ the Act but would not be found to violate 
the Equal Protectiqn Clause standing alone, was the Act a valid 
exercise of Congress's powaw under § 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment? That throws us right i~to the troublesome doctrine 
'-' 
announced in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, and modified (?) 
in Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112. In other words, in thisfA~~~ 
case>deciding on statutory grounds would not enable the Court 
to avoid constitutional questions. In fact, it simply adds 
an additional one. We ~uld still have to determine what the 
Equal Protection clause standing aiaRgx alone would require--
in order to know if Congress has gone further. And then comes 




In this cureous setting, it seems appropriate to decide 
the Equal Protection question first. The SG seems to urge 
this, suggesting that we should consider the EE6A as primarily 
concerned with remedies and not intended to go beyond the 
unadorned 
AEqual Protection clause in its statement of substantive law. 
Se~G's brief at 18. 
In case this course proves impossible or undesirable, I 
offer my tentative views on the statute. Most of the statute 
seems clearly intended to ban segregation or discrimination 
based on the categories usually proscribed: race, color, national 
origin, and sex. ~t § 1703La) does not mention sex: -No state shall deny equal educational opportunity 
to an individual on account of his or her race, color, 
sex, or national sxigiaR origin, by--
(a) the deliberate segregation by an educational 
agency of students on the basis of race, color, or 
national origin among or within schools. 
Nebertheless subsection (c) goes on to condemn assignments 
among schools, if the assignment results in greater segregation 
by sex (unless it is an assignement to the nearest schoml). 
Then ~ 1705 forbids assignment even to the nearest school if 
it is for the purpose of segregation on the basis of, inter alia, --
sex. 
The le~isla~ive history apparently gives no help in 
untangling this mess. No solution is completely satisfactory, 
but I think the SG does the best job, brief at 20. He suggests 
that ~ 1703 be read as permitting sex segregation within schools 
(so as to permit separate gym classes, locker areas, etc.), but 
not overcoming the other sections with respect to sex segregation 
among schools. There is support for this notion in § 1720(c), 
not cited by the court of appeals. 
-4-
If this is a valid interpretation, then resp's policy 
violates either § 1703(c) or § 1705. Resp xixa tries to avoid 
this result by saying it has not assigned anyone to either 
Central or Girls; all admissions are based on voluntary appli-
cations. I don't buy this. Once a student qualifies for 
an academic high school and chooses to go that route, he or 
she is assigned to one school or the other based solely on 
sex. 
Finally, if this is the construction, I think gaRgxaax 
the statuee is probably valid under Morgan. But I have always 
found that case one of the most troublesome in constitutional 
law, and I would want to review the literature it has generated 
before taking a final stance on this question. 
The Equal Protection clause. Both courts below noted some 
differences between ... Girls and Central, but both concluded 
that they were "substantially equal." If substantial equality 
is sufficient, and if there is no independent reason~to apply 
Craig v. Boren scrutiny simply because a gender classification 
is employed, then there really is not an Equal Protection 
question presented. This is essentially resp's position. 
I( ,, 
In my view, Craig v. Boren scrutiny applies. First, and 
< 
less important, the crucial language from Craig is this: 
"classifications by gender must serve important governmental 
objectives and must be substantially related to achievement 
of those objectives." (slip at 7). Other cases also imply 
that mere classification is enough to merit scrutiny. I don't 
think it can be denied that there is at least a classification 
-5-
by geneer operative here. 
More importantly, I do not think there is "substantial 
e_gualitf1" hereff'l'. Or--perhaps to say the same thing in different 
language--xke one must be more sensitive to differences that 
do exist when a sex classification is employed in the realm 
of education. See Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629; Brown v. 
Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483. . ~ 
A. T~ngible factors. I think~ both courts fa£H&~x 
~lJ£Q~ &R when they concluded that there was substantial 
equality, were focusing on tangible factors like quality of 
facilities and student-faculty ratios. They alax also looked 
to the fact that graduates of both schools are readily accepted 
by highly regarded colleges. ~Hkx These factors are certainly 
important. But there is one tangible factor with respect to 
wh~h Central excels: science facilities. I cannot understand 
why neither court below xkax thought this difference was 
"substantial." Certainly if I were a female interested in 
pursuing a science career, I would regard these differences 
as quite substantial--even though I might acknowledge that to 
they 
most students ix/would make no difference. 
B. Intangible factors. Ordinarily we lawyers are a 
hard-nosed lot. Intangible factors don't count for much if 
tangible factors point ~ strongly a to a certain conclusion. 
But in xkixxaxeaxxx the realm of constitutional law involved here, 
there is highly respected precedent emphasizing the importance 
segregation3 of intangibles: Sweatt and Brow~. Both involved racial/aix£ximi-
immediately 
RaxiaR~ and cerminly one does notjreact to sex segregation in 
the same fashion. Bt!f! as ! havE r'eRseFes ~ eus FQ&eeien pat~?'it:>-
-6-
Since sex segregation doesn't have quite the same invidious 
"feel," it seems that intangibles assume correspondingly 
lower importance. 
But as I have pondered my own reaction pattern, I have 
come to wonder whether my reactions are not the product of 
long-standing practice and "old notions" (see Stanton v. 
~ntan, 421 U.S. 7) that simply cause intangibles to seem 
less important to me viewing the situation through male eyes. 
I wonder whether many would not have had a somewhat similar 
feeling about race segregation xkxiXJ thtrty years ago. My 
point is certainly not that sex segregation is as invidious 
as race discrimination--for many purposes one must treat the 
multiple 
two quite differently, as the/"tiers" of this court's traditional 
analysis bear witness. t My point is that the intangible factors 
~~~deserve as careful attention here as they did in the 
earlier cases. - -The intangibles are these: history and prestige of Central 
~----------------------
(Philadelphia,of course, can't do much about these at this 
c~~ point), books in tre library, the endowment fund and the~ 
re swl-k ; ff d . ~ _ o ere . 
'"' ·~ 
None of these is very important in itself, but in 
effec~ they cannot help but carry a message: Girls ;;~~ c~ulative 
~.~... .J;iS not the fi~h * 
~ t•r.o~. 
• a s symptomatic. 
best/school in Philadelphia; Central is. The diploma 
By statute, only Central is authorized to grant 
0~ ().ec.f)'i'L's 
; ..... ~···~s 
111>1 ~~--) 
s~'J 
omething called a Bachelor of Arts degree, while Girls, like ---- - -other schools,simply awards a diploma. The eife£xx«X tangible 
effect of the two is the same. One cannot enter law school on 
the strength of a Central B.A. But the symbolism is clearly 
there. 
* I ~ ~ of'~ J;~~ ...vt.....r-c:. Gc'.,-ls i..1 
~.e.rr ~ ~v~. 
r 
I hope I am not overstating the differences. In any 
substantial 
event, I do conclude that they are/enough to RHk~e£x say that 
the schools are not equal--meaning the assignment policy must 
be tested under Craig v. Boren. The state's aim purposes 
good · 
are clearly important: fostering/academic iRxixaRmeRX attitudeS -
and improving achliYement. And the Jones study~ited in the 
lower court apinions shows that there is some relation between 
toward academic pursuits 
sex segregation and attitudes/(although it said nothing about 
achievemen~. But I do not think the demonstrated relation is 
even as substantial as the relation shown in Craig. Moreover, 
if Philadelphia really believes that sex segregation makes 
a substantial contribution to learning, then it is hard to 
HBR understand why it has not decreed sex segregation for 
all its high schools. 
If the Court follows the outline~ reasoning in holding 
for petr, then it would not be saying that all schools must -
be coeducational. It would simply be saying that a school 
system that chooses single-sex schools must be scrupulous in .... 
a~uring equality. I think that avoiding the broader separate-
but-equal question is desirable in iteelf, although I do acknowledge 
~ 
that a aei£ decision as I have outlined~ may make it quite 
~ 
hard for public school systems, as a practical matter, to sustain 
single-sex schools . 
..., ... -- ,, ,, 
T~ ~The right to coedua£ion. I see nothing in this cliim. Here 
the most lenient '~ational basis~ standard applies, and I think resp 
has met that. 
Remand. The SG suggests a remand, essentially for further 
*"I ~~.,..k. ~T,·J.io~ ~~ ~~~-­
v..o ~"o.t~ ~~ ~· 
-8-
inquiry into the tangible effects of the intangible differences . 
I have summarized above. I think that wuld be a mistake. ~F~j--~t.,, 
1rhe SG seems to suggest that the DC should be required to figure 
out the economic impact (in connection with career opportunities) 
that would obtain if a woman went to RR«xxal Central instead 
of gjxlx Girls. I am not sure that can be meaningfully 
done. More importantly, it seems we know enough now to decide. 
In saying this, I emphasize that I do not think the course 
I have sketched above amounts to this eourt refinding the 
facts. It amounts to reassessing the legal significance 
of undisputed facts. 
On this basis, I xa«lsxxaxa recommend reversal. 
D.M. 
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THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
~u:p-umt C!fou.d of t4t ~ttittb ~htttg 
~agJrittghttt, ~. ~· 2ll&f'l-.;l 
March 9, 1977 
Re: 76-37 - Vorchheimer v. School District of 
Philadelphia 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
In today's special Conference, the vote on the merits 
remained as it was at the March 4 Conference. 
I therefore propose that notwithstanding Bill Rehnquist's 
"disclaimer," we defer consideration until his current 
views are known. In my view, action by an equally 
divided Court would be open to valid criticism as an 
institutional failure to meet our obligations. 
However, should that be the ultimate result, I will 
write my view on why the absence of one Justice should 
lead to reargument. 
Obviously, we did not take this case to evaluate findings 
against the record but only to decide whether gender 
separatedequal schools are "inherently unequal," and 





THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
~uprmtt C!Jcurt ttf tqt 'Jllnittb ~httttt 
Jfattqi:ttgtttn. ~. <!J. 2llg!J!.' 
March 9, 1977 
Re: 76-37 - Vorchheimer v. School District of 
Philadelphia 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
/ 
In today's special Conference, the vote on the merits 
remained as it was at the March 4 Conference. 
I therefore propose that notwithstanding Bill Rehnquist's 
"disclaimer," we defer consideration until his current 
views are known. In my view, action by an equally 
divided Court would be open to valid criticism as an 
institutional failure to meet our obligations. 
However, should that be the ultimate result, I will 
write my view on why the absence of one Justice should 
lead . to reargument. 
viously, we did not take this case to evaluate findings 
ainst the record but only to decide whether gender 
paratedequal schools are "inherently unequal," and 
at issue should neither be evaded nor delayed. 







THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
~uttrtntt <qcurt cf ±4t 'J!tnittb ~tatttt 
'Jl!TnttJringhm. ~. <q. 2ll.?Jl.~ 
'" April 11, 1977 
Re: 76-37 - Vorchheimer v. School District of Philadelphia 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
I am -not sure I have a clear picture on the motion 
for reargument. 
In the posture that the case stands now, it seems to 
me that there would be ge6uine institutional "negatives" 
in having it reaffirmed by an equally divided Court even 
though I agree with the results reached by that process. 
It is one thing to affirm a case of significance 
with an equally divided Court when there is nothing we 
can do about it (as in the 1969 Term with only eight 
Justices), but it is quite another to follow that course 
when it will merely require one hour of additional time 
at the final oral argument session, at which time Bill 
Rehnquist will be able to participate. 
I have ;~ uneasy feeling that the DeFunis case will 
be linked with this -- erroneously, of course; but it may 
appear even to some thoughtful people that the Court had 
evaded the issue at a time when the addition of one hour 
to the argument session would produce a definitive result. 
We should act on this promptly because the parties 
should be notified very quickly if it is to be set for re-
argument in the second week of final session. 
':!i. ·~,·, 
1:. 









I view the case as 
to "let the chips" 
involving unique facts, 
lie where they fell. 
~ 











.$)u:prtut.e <qcu:rt ttf tqt 'J!ittitth ~~ 
2]l!rattfringhm, :!9. <q. 2ll.;t.l!$ 
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
April 18, 1977 
Re: No. 76-37 - Vorchheimer v. School District 
of Philadelphia 
Dear Chief: 
As at conference, my vote is to reargue. I feel the 
Court will look bad, or at least awkward, if, under the cir-
cumstances that attend this case, we affirm by an equally 
divided vote. 
Sincerely, 
fl. u. 6. 
The Chief Justice 
cc: The Conference 
d.v- 9 ~~~-.;# 
~~~~ 








.§uputttt (!J{tlttf .of Ur~ ~u~ .§fattg 
',$aglyi:ttgftm, ~. <!J. 21!gi'!$ 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
April 18, 1977 
Re: 76-37 - Vorchheirner v. School Dist. of 
Philadelphia 
Dear Chief: 
My vote is not to reargue. 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMB ERS Of 
.§uprcmt Qfllltti 11f fJr.c ~tifd~ ~wtts 
Jnas-Jringtcn, ~. tq:. 20.?.1!-~ 
JUSTICE WM.J . BRENNAN, JR. 
April 18, 1977 
RE: No. 76-37 Vorchheimer v. School District Philadelphia 
Dear Chief: 





The Chief Justice 
cc: The Conference 
,. 
t I I J 
CHAMBERS O F 
JUSTICE POTTER STE WART 
.§u:punu <!Jllltrlltf tirr 'J!lnitt~ .§btt£5 
~all~ gl. <!J. 2!lbi~~ 
April 18, 1977 -
Re: No. 76-37 - Vorchheimer v. 
School District of Philadelphia et al. 
Dear Chief, 
The Per Curiam you have circulated 
today seems correct to me. 
Sincerely yours, 
t? ~ . 
I • 
/ 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
~ltJlTtttu ~4lttrt ot tqt ~t~ ,jmtte 
',Waelfittghm. !}. ~· 2Llbi'l-.;l 
CHAMBERS O F" 
JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE 
April 18, 1977 
Re: No. 76-37 - Vorchheimer v. Philadelphia 
Dear Chief: 
Although I thought the case should be 
argued, the per curiam you have circulated seems 
to reflect the Conference vote. 
The Chief Justice 





THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
-
.iu:vumt <!fourt of tqt ~tti:ttb .itatte 
~aeqhtgton. ~. ~· 2!1~'1-~ 
April 1 8, 1977 
RE: 76-37 - Vorchheimer v. School District 
of Philadelphia 
Dear Harry: 
Your memo of today re the above is what I tried 
and failed to get five votes for last Friday. We 
will look "bad" and the four who voted to reargue 
need not waive the ancient right to say "What did 
we tell you"! 
However, until the Court gives me two votes as 
in ancient English law when a court is equally 
divided, I find it difficult to cope with four 
unre ge nerate, unreconstructed "rebels"! In which 
case I conduct as orderly a retreat as possible! 
Regards, 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
Copies to the Conference 
~nvunu {!fonrl ltf .tlr.t ~ub- ~hrl.t.a' 
:Jla;;r~ttm. ~. <If. 20.;1~~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
April 19, 1977 
Re: 76-37 - Vorchheimer v. School District 
of Philadelphia 
Dear Chief: 
Please join me. 
Respectfully, 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
.iUJtrtutt ~ottrt of tqt ~b .;§taftg 
'lDuJrington, ~. "t· 2ll,?J.l.~ 
CHAM8ERS 01" 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL April 19, 1977 
Re: No. 76-37, Vorchheimer v. School District of Philadelphia 
Dear Chief: 




The Chief Justice 
cc: The Conference 
(Slip Opinion) 
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication 
In the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are re-
quested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the 
United States, Washington, D.C. 20543, of any typographical or other 
formal errors, In order that corrections may be made before the pre-
liminary print goes to press. 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 76-37 
Susan Lynn Vorchheimer, by her parents 
Bert and Carol Vorchheimer, 
etc., Petitioner, 
v. 
School District of Philadelphia et al. 
[April 19, 1977] 
PER CuRIAM. 
On Writ of Certio-
rari to the United 
States Court of 
Appeals for the 
Third Circuit. 
The judgment is affirmed by an equally divided Court. 
MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST took no part in the consideration 























 . .T. 11. 
P. S. 
B
. TI. 
W
. 
T
. :.I. 
H
._
\ 
B
. 
L. F. 
P
. 
\Y
. 
IT. 
H
. 
.T. 
1'. :-:. 
vc.. 
'/ /tr/?? 
~
 
~
 C9' 
~
c
?
J
 
;r:c9 
~
~
 
~
c
9
 
~
-
'fJt!/?1 
~
 
~
t
X
'
 
tt/Jr/,1 
"j,rl·r1 
<
1
/tf/{1
 
Y/1'/~J 
vft('Yl 
~
 -J_.-
0, 
Y
)rt/7
 7 
J 
~
c
9
 
'flt1"1i.., 
76-37 V
orc h
h
eim
er v
. 
~
c
h
o
o
l
 
D
is
t1 . 
o
f 
P
h
ila
. 
